Party Walls--Nature--Creation--Termination by Curreri, Anthony
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 8 
Number 2 Volume 8, May 1934, Number 2 Article 7 
June 2014 
Party Walls--Nature--Creation--Termination 
Anthony Curreri 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Curreri, Anthony (1934) "Party Walls--Nature--Creation--Termination," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 8 : No. 2 , 
Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENT
showing, says the court, that this was the intent of Congress when
the Act was adopted and that Congress is fully satisfied with the
interpretation of the courts of this section with regard to rent claims.
One might, with all due respect, ask why the same argument was
not applied in the case of Maynard v. Elliot 40 in which the Supreme
Court decided that contingent claims were provable under the pres-
ent Act. It is equally applicable. As we have stated before, the
first three Bankruptcy Acts adopted by Congress expressly allowed
contingent claims. In the first two the contingent claims allowed
were listed, while the third allowed contingent claims generally,
excepting, by more or less express language, future rent. The fourth
and present Act, however, says absolutely nothing about contingent
claims. Might it not be said that such action on the part of Congress
showed an intent that no contingent claims should be allowed? Stat-
utes of a like nature were so construed in England before our pres-
ent Act was adopted. 41 And our own courts for many years so
interpreted the Act of 1898 without any interference or alteration
by Congress, 42 showing, one might readily say, the "construction
adopted by the courts has been acceptable to the legislative arm of
the government." 43 But in 1931 the Supreme Court decided that
contingent claims are provable under the present section.44 One is
forced to conclude that they are irreconcilable decisions.
The Supreme Court does not, however, eternally condemn the
landlord to stand in trembling and fear of the ever-threatening bank-
ruptcy of his tenant. They hold out one faint and flickering beacon
of salvation to him. Being reluctant to change a rule so long im-
bedded in our land law, reluctant to place a different interpretation
on the Bankruptcy Act than that established so long by the decisions
of the lower courts, with the apparent sanction of the legislature,
leaving a bad situation where it finds it, the Supreme Court of the
United States holds out this parting word of advice:
"If the rule is to be changed Congress should so
declare." 45
HAROLD V. DixoN.
PARTY WALLS-NATURE-CREATION-TERMINATION.
From the layman's point of view, a party wall is a wall erected
on a line between adjoining property-owners and used in common.'
'Ibid.
Supra note 22.
"Ibid.
Supra note 34.
"Supra note 29.
"Ibid.
IFUNK & WAGNALLS, PRACTICAL STANDARD DICTIONARY (1930) 827.
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Technically, the term has been used in connection with division walls
in four different senses.2  It may refer to
(1) a wall of which, with the land beneath, the owners of the
two adjoining buildings are tenants in common;
(2) a wall divided longitudinally into two strips, one belonging
to each of the neighboring owners and each having the right to use
his strip only;
(3) a wall located entirely on the land of one and belonging
entirely to him, but subject to an easement in the other owner to
have it maintained as a division wall between the two properties and
to use it for purposes of support;
(4) a wall divided longitudinally into two strips, each of the
adjoining owners owning the strip on his side only, but having an
easement in the other strip for the purposes of support of his
building.
In England and Canada, a division wall is presumed to belong
to the first of the above classes. 3 In this country, the great weight
of authority is against the recognition of this presumption, although
there are some cases to the effect that the adjoining owners of a
party wall standing in part on the land of each are tenants in common
of the wall.4  The general rule adopted in this country is that a
party wall almost invariably belongs to the fourth class mentioned
above,5 except, of course, in those few cases when, the wall having
been built entirely on the property of one landowner, the party wall
properly falls within the third class.6 This undoubtedly is the New
York rule too.7 The logical consequences of such a rule are that each
owner owns in severalty so much of the wall as stands on his land,
but his estate in the wall is subject to an easement of the other owner
of support for his building from the entire wall and of the mainte-
22 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (4th ed. 1920) 1244; 47 C. J. 1324.
' Cubitt v. Porter, 8 B. & C. 257 (1826) ; Watson v. Grey, 14 Ch. D. 192(1827); 47 C. J. 1324, n. 16a (In England and in Canada it has been held
that, in the absence of other evidence of the ownership of a party wall, the
common use of it by the adjoining proprietors raises the presumption that they
own the wall and the land on which it stands in common; such presumption
may, however, be rebutted by proof of the actual title).
'Weil v. Baker, 39 La. Ann. 1102, 3 So. 361 (1887) (in which the court
says, "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the whole wall, as it stands
* * * is presumed to be a wall in common. There is no division of ownership
of a wall in common. The whole belongs jointly to the neighboring pro-
prietors * * *) ; Scott v. Baird, 145 Mich. 116, 108 N. W. 737 (1906).5 WALSH, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) 650; 2 TIFFANY, op. ci. supra
note 2, at 1245, n. 61; 3 GERARD, N. Y. REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1926) 2286;
47 C. J. 1325, n. 22.
02 TIFFANY, op. cit, supra note 2, at 1224, n. 60.
'Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 N. Y. 601 (1857) ; Hendricks v. Stark, 37 N. Y.
106 (1867); Brooks v. Curtis, 50 N. Y. 639 (1873); Rogers v. Sinsheimer,
50 N. Y. 646 (1873); Sherred v. Cisco, 4 Sandf. 480, 6 N. Y. Super. Ct.
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nance of the wall as a party wall.8 Moreover, although each owner
owns in severalty his own soil beneath the wall up to the boundary
line between the two properties, the soil of each is burdened with an
easement and servitude of support in favor of the other and the
title of each owner is qualified by the easement to which the other
is entitled.9
Notwithstanding a party wall easement is a burden on the soil
and qualifies the title of each of the adjoining landowners, it "is not
an encumbrance on either of the parcels involved. It exists for the
common benefit of both parcels, used or to be used for the advantage
of each, and is therefore no objection to a title. Each parcel is
benefited, not merely in the saving of half the cost of the wall, but
in saving the additional space that an independent wall would
require." 10 Since it is a benefit to the land, each owner must be
allowed to increase the height of his building, using the party wall
for that purpose, to extend the wall to the rear and enlarge it, if
necessary.11 But if the party-wall agreement provides for the
rebuilding of the wall of the same height and thickness and of the
same material, this is clearly an encumbrance as would constitute a
valid objection to title under a contract of sale since it binds both
parcels to a perpetuation of the same wall and, in effect, of the same
buildings.12
Party-wall easements may arise in one of several ways. They
may be "created by express grant or covenant, the common form of
party-wall agreement being executed prior to the erection of a
building on one of the parcels, the owner of the other parcel prom-
ising to pay one-half of the cost of the wall (or such other proportion
or fixed amount as may be agreed upon), whenever he should build
on his lot and make use of the wall." 13 Such an express covenant
'Sherred v. Cisco, supra note 7.
'Partridge v. Gilbert, supra note 7, at 614. Judge Denio said,
"Each had a title to the soil to the division line, * * * but this title
was qualified by the easement which each owner had of supporting his
building by means of the common wall."
Brooks v. Curtis, supra note 7, at 642. The court said,
"Although land covered by a party wall remains the several prop-
erty of the owner of each half, yet the title of each owner is qualified
by the easement to which the other is entitled."
3 GERARD, foc, cit. supra note 5.
" WALs H, op. cit. supra note 5, at 653; Hendricks v. Stark, suprz note 7.
"Brooks v. Curtis, supra note 7 (a party wall is a structure for the bene-
fit and convenience of both the tenants whom it separates and either party may
make any use of it which he may require, either by deepening the foundation
or increasing the height); Bull v. Barton, 227 N. Y. 101, 124 N.' E. 111
(1919); Hermann v. Hartwood Holding Co., 193 App. Div. 115, 183 N. Y.
Supp. 402 (1st Dept. 1920) ; 47 C. J. 1344, n. 10.
"O'Neill v. Van Tassel, 137 N. Y. 297, 33 N. E. 314 (1893).
"WALSH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 652; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 1262; Cutting v. Stokes, 148 N. Y. 730, 42 N. E. 722 (1895); Mott v.
Oppenheimer, 135 N. Y. 312, 31 N. E. 1047 (1892).
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or grant may apply to a definite building being built or about to be
built or it may take the form of permanent mutual easements ih
favor of and against each parcel. Destruction of the building, in
the first case, would terminate any easement in its favor, while, in
the latter case, the easement would survive. 14
The agreement between the adjoining landowners need not be
express, but may also be, and very often is, implied from the acts
of the parties. Thus party-wall easements arise when adjoining
owners erect buildings with a common wall.15 They may come into
being, too, by estoppel as where one who acquiesces in the use of the
dividing wall by the adjoining owner is estopped from denying that
the wall is a party wall. 16 And where a wall between adjoining
buildings has been used uninterruptedly during the prescriptive per-
iod as a party wall, it becomes a party wall within the legal sense of
the term' 7 even though the wall stands wholly on the land of one
of the owners.' 8
Most frequently, however, party-wall easements arise by implied
grant or reservation. When the common owner of adjoining lots
erects on them buildings supported by a common wall and conveys
each lot to different persons, or conveys one and retains the other,
each acquires title to one half the wall and an easement of support
in the other half, even though the conveyances say nothing about
the rights of parties in the wall.19 The fact that the wall stands
wholly on the ground of one of the grantees does not prevent an
easement from arising in favor of the other under the same circum-
stances.
2 0
The writer has gone into a detailed discussion of the nature and
theory of party walls and party wall easements and outlined the
various methods of their creation because he feels a thorough under-
standing of the principles underlying the subject is necessary before
he can attempt a clear dissertation on the main theme, which is: How
and when are party-wall easements terminated? The recent case of
1" Mott v. Oppenheimer, supra note 13.
" Rindge v. Baker, 57 N. Y. 209 (1874); Sherred v. Cisco, spra note 7.
"8Brooks v. Curtis, supra note 7; Cherry v. Brizzolara, 89 Ark. 309, 116
S. W. 668 (1909); WALSH, op. cit. sitpra note 5, at 651.
"'Browning v. Goldenberg, 36 Misc. 438, 72 N. Y. Supp. 759 (1901),
aff'd, 71 App. Div. 616, 76 N. Y. Supp. 1010 (1st Dept. 1902); Eno v. Del
Vecchio, 4 Duer 53 (11 N. Y. Super. Ct. 1854).
' Pearsall v. Westcott, 30 App. Div. 99, 51 N. Y. Supp. 663 (3rd Dept.
1898).
" Heartt v. Kruger, 121 N. Y. 386, 24 N. E. 841 (1890); Eno v. Del
Vecchio and Snyder, 6 Duer 17 (13 N. Y. Super. Ct. 1856); Everett v.
Edwards, 149 Mass. 588, 22 N. E. 52 (1889).
'Rogers v. Sinsheimer, supra note 7 (holding that the grantee of the
other lot has also the right to occupy the space of the two inches between the
wall and the boundary of his lot); Schaefer v. Blumenthal, 169 N. Y. 221,
62 N. E. 175 (1901); Note (1913) 13 COL. L. REv. 754. But see Sloat v. Mc-
Dougal, 9 N. Y. Supp. 631 (1896).
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357 East Seventy-Sixth Street Corp. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 21
brings us the latest words of the Court of Appeals on this point of
law. Plaintiff and defendant were respective owners of adjacent
premises, acquiring title through mesne conveyances from a common
grantor who erected tenement houses on both lots with a party wall
equally upon each. Plaintiff tore down the building on its premises,
except the party wall, intending to build a garage, using the party
wall for support on that side. Before it could do this, defendant
tore down the building on its premises, together with the party wall,
with the intention of building an ice-plant. Thereby plaintiff was
obliged to build an independent wall on its own premises. In an
action to recover for the extra expense of building the independent
wall (when the party wall would have been entirely adequate) and
for loss of rental space, held, by a five-to-two decision, plaintiff's
easement in the party wall had its origin by implication when the
common ownership in the wall was severed and conveyed to separate
owners; that the easement was measured, in its extent and duration.
by the existence of the necessity for it; and when plaintiff demolished
its building, it put an end to the necessity of support on its side of
the wall. To the defendant, then, came the option either to continue
the wall for the support of its own existing building or to put a
definitive end to the easement.
Plaintiff contended that its rights in and to the wall continued
so long as the wall itself remained standing in a fit and suitable state
for further use as a party wall, and the demolishing of the wall by
the defendant was an unauthorized destruction of the plaintiff's
property and property rights.22  One of the principles discussed
above is that each owner owns in severalty as much of the wall as
stands on his land.23 From this it would follow that he has a prop-
erty right in at least half of it and an unauthorized interference
with the property right would give him a right of action for damages
for any injuries sustained. This was plaintiff's contention. How
did the court get over this seemingly unsurmountable obstacle?
Let us examine the cases on which the court based its decision.
Judge Crouch quoted extensively from Heartt v. Kruger 24 to the
effect that the "easement was measured, in its extent and duration,
by the existence of the necessity for it. When the necessity ceased,
as it did by the destruction of the buildings and wall, the rights
resulting from it ceased also," 25 and also from Partridge v. Gil-
bert 2 6 to the same effect. Taken by themselves, these words sustain
the court's view. The two buildings and the party wall undoubtedly
were destroyed in the instant case. Superficially, then, the law
-263 N. Y. 63, 188 N. E. 158 (1933).
SId. at 64.
= Supra note 8.
SSupra note 19.
= Id. at 392.
'Supra note 7.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
would seem to hold that plaintiff's rights ceased when the buildings
were destroyed.
But before the reader reaches any conclusions as to the sound-
ness of the court's ruling, let the writer, too, quote from Heartt v.
Kruger:
"The implied agreement that the party wall, existing at
the time of the conveyances of the two lots by their common
owner, should continue in its use and occupancy as such,
cannot be extended so as to relate to a changed condition of
things, caused by the casual destruction of the wall and the
buildings." 27 (Italics writer's.)
And on the next page,
"The mutual easements existed by force of the situation
at the time of the severance of the ownership of the two lots,
and, with the change in that situation produced by the casual
destruction of the buildings, the reason for their existence
ceased."
"Casual" means that which happens accidentally or is brought about
by cause unknown.2 8 How did the destruction take place in the
case of Heartt v. Kruger? The buildings and the wall were destroyed
simultaneously by fire. This was a casual destruction. In Connelly
v. Fish,29 the buildings and party wall were also destroyed by fire.
The court said, "It was a party wall, but the easement of joint use
therein, to the interest of both parties, did not survive the destruction
of the wall so long as that destruction occurred without fault of
either of the owners. This proposition is settled, I think for the
first time, in the Court of Appeals in Heartt v. Kruger." 30 (Italics
writer's.) This case was not mentioned in the Knickerbocker Ice
Company case, but it is given a place in this discussion because it is
valuable in helping us to see how other courts have construed Heartt
v. Kruger. Judge Kiley construed "casual" as meaning "without
fault."
Into that category very easily falls Partridge v. Gilbert. In that
case one of the buildings had become so dilapidated as to be unfit
and unsafe for use. Defendant, in order to rebuild, took down his
building and the party wall, because the party wall also was too
weak for use. This destruction of the party wall was in no way the
'Supra note 19, at 391.
'Lewis v. Lofley, 92 Ga. 804, 19 S. E. 57 (1894); BLAcx, LAW DICTION-
ARY (3rd ed. 1933) 175; WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1932)
343 (happening to come or pass without design, and without being foreseen
or expected).
" 152 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1914).31 Id. at 375.
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fault of the owner. He could properly be called the agent of natural
causes, as he merely consummated a condition which, to all intents
and purposes, already existed.
As can be readily seen, the two cases on which the Court of
Appeals relied in reaching its decision are radically different in
their facts from the case before the court. In one, Heartt v. Kruger,
the destruction of the wall was purely casual; in the other, Partridge
v. Gilbert, without fault of either party. In both cases the court
-came to the same conclusion, that under such circumstances the
party wall easements, since they arose by implied grant or reserva-
tion, ceased when the walls were destroyed unintentionally. Was
the court justified in extending that principle to a case of wilful
destruction of a party wall so that the innocent party could be
deprived of his property and property rights or easements in
the wall?
All the adjudicated cases on the destruction and termination of
party wall easements are cases where the wall was accidentally de-
stroyed or became unfit for its purposes by accident or age.31 The
writer has been unable to find any case where an intentional destruc-
tion of a wall in good condition was held to destroy the easement of
the other owner. True, there are no cases giving a right of action for
damages to the injured party in such case. Where there is no prece-
dent upon which a court can base its decision, it must be guided by
general principles governing the point of law in issue and bolster its
decision by analogy to similar cases. On principle, the injured party
should have a right of action for damages when the wall in good
condition is wilfully destroyed, because certainly he owns half the
wall and certainly its wilful destruction by the other owner injures
him. Reasoning by analogy, it would seem that the court could not
logically rely on Heartt v. Kruger, a case of casual destruction, and
Partridge v. Gilbert, a case of destruction without fault, for any
guidance, because their basic facts are not analogous to the facts
in the Knickerbocker Ice Co. case, where the wall was in good con-
dition and destroyed intentionally.
The only ground on which the court could have rightfully
decided as it did is the ground of abandonment. But even here the
argument falls through. To be an abandonment it must be shown
that the owner destroyed his building with no intention of using again
the party wall, which intention would best be shown by his rebuild-
ing with an independent wall.32 But, in the Knickerbocker Ice Co.
case, not only did the plaintiff not intend to abandon the wall, but it
expressly made known its intention to use the wall. It filed with the
building department plans for a garage to be erected on its premises,
showing the intended use of the party wall as a supporting, and
retaining wall. "Thereupon the defendant, with full knowledge of
47 C. J. 1333, §22.
'Duncan v. Rodecker, 90 Wis. 1, 62 N. W. 533 (1895).
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the facts and over the objection and protest of the plaintiff, took
down its building including the entire party wall." 3 It could not
possibly be maintained that plaintiff had abandoned the wall and its
rights in it.
Had plaintiff wished to raise the height of its building, extend
the wall to the rear or alter the tenement house that originally stood
on the premises, it could have used the party wall for that purpose
and defendant could not rightfully have interfered. Why, then,
should defendant be allowed to interfere when plaintiff wishes to
erect a new building, fully satisfied with the condition of the wall as
it exists? There is authority holding that one who wishes to rebuild
cannot tear down the party wall when it is not dilapidated but must
use it, if it affords a sufficient support for his building.34  Plaintiff
was doing no more than complying with the law. Should he be
penalized? The writer respectfully submits that on principle and
reason the court went astray. The doubts that the court itself
evinced by the dissent of two judges, who unfortunately did not hand
down opinions, have been, in the writer's estimation, resolved against
the decision of the court.
ANTHONY CURRERI.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS-CERTAINTY OF PURPOSE.
A charitable trust is a gift to indefinite or uncertain beneficiaries
for the purpose of "either bringing their minds or hearts under
the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies 'from
disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish them-
selves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works,
or otherwise lessening the burdens of government." ' At the out-
set it is well to note certain distinctive features of this type of trust.
(1) It is founded upon a humanitarian view looking to the
improvement and well being of mankind.2
"357 East Seventy-sixth Street Corp. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 237 App.
Div. 717, 262 N. Y. Supp. 705 (1st Dept. 1933).
' Partridge v. Lyon, 67 Hun 29, 21 N. Y. Supp. 848 (1893).
1Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365, 369 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894);
Stuart v. Easton, 74 Fed. 854, 859 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1896), aff'd, 170 U. S. 383,
18 Sup. Ct. 650 (1898) ; People v. Fitch, 154 N. Y. 14, 32, 47 N. E. 983, 988(1897) ; Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 556 (1867).
'Ould v. Washington Hospital, 95 U. S. 303, 24 L. ed. 450 (1874) ; Tilden
v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880 (1892), wherein the phrase "well doing
and well being of mankind" was used in denoting the purpose of the chari-
table trust.
